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Abstract: There are several types of security threats that can give rise to vulnerability issues and performance 
degradation for the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The existing protocols that incorporate security features 
for authentication, key management, and secure routing, have not able to protect the WSN, effectively but a 
new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can overcome these problems. The IDS collects data for analysis in 
order to identify any abnormal behaviour at the sensor nodes, which if present, could indicate an attack on the 
network. Many different intrusion detection systems for wireless sensor networks have been proposed in the 
past years. This paper focuses on the security requirements, layering-based attacks, and intrusion detection in 
WSN. 
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1. Introduction 
The distributed wireless technology in 
sensor networks has been applied various types of 
systems and applications. RF communication is 
used to link together the huge number of wireless 
sensors in a wireless sensor network (WSN). These 
nodes are responsible for gathering and distribution 
of information in the network. The network and 
nodes can be affected by different types of attacks. 
If an affected node is still running and exchanging 
data across the network, it could lead to loss of its 
power supply and could, in the worst case scenario, 
eventually become a dead node (Anisi, Abdullah, & 
Razak, 2012; Babaie, Khadem-zadeh, & Badie, 
2012; Bidgoli, Pajouhesh, & Ahmadi, 2011; Khan, 
Loo, & Din, 2010; Krontiris, Benenson, Giannetsos, 
Freiling, & Dimitriou, 2009; Rajani Muraleedharan 
& Osadciw, 2006; P. Sharma, Sharma, & Singh, 
2012). In addition, because of limited resources, 
some WSN applications are not able to take 
advantage of certain network security features. The 
Quality of Service (QoS) could be affected because 
of the small node size. In the WSN, battery power 
supply is very limited and this restricts the amount 
of memory that could be used for optimum 
performance (Kavitha & Haritha, 2011; Ranjani 
Muraleedharan & Osadciw, 2003; Noack & Spitz, 
2009; Sahadevaiah & PVGD, 2011; K. Sharma & 
Ghose, 2010). This paper focuses on the security 
requirements, layering-based attacks, and intrusion 
detection in the WSN. In section 2 will go through 
the security requirement in WSN, section 3 will 
focus on layering-based attacks, in section 4 we will 
explain the IDS in WSN, in section 5 we will 
describe the cryptography in WSN, finally section 6 
is the conclusion. 
2. Security Requirements 
A sensor network can be considered to be 
a special type of network, which likewise, has 
specific security requirements, these requirements 
are mainly related to the data confidentiality; data 
integrity; data freshness; network availability; and 
data authenticity (Carman, Kruus, & Matt, 2000; 
Modares, 2009; Modares, Salleh, & 
Moravejosharieh, 2011; Mohanty, Panigrahi, 
Sarma, & Satapathy, 2010; Perrig, Szewczyk, 
Tygar, Wen, & Culler, 2002; Walters, Liang, Shi, & 
Chaudhary, 2007; Yoneki & Bacon, 2005): 
2.1. Data Confidentiality 
Data confidentiality is the most critical 
issue in network security. In sensor networks, data 
confidentiality is related to the following: 
 The readings from the sensor in any network 
should not be leaked to neighbouring sensors. 
The information from these readings could be 
very sensitive, especially, information for 
military use. 
 A secure channel for data transmission, as data 
in many applications is highly sensitive, for 
example, the distribution of keys across the 
network. 
 The public information of the sensor such as 
sensor identity and public keys, should be 
encrypted to ensure protection against traffic 
analysis type-attacks.  
Data encryption has become the standard method 
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for protecting the sensitive data, thus, protecting 
data confidentiality, is general. 
2.2. Data Integrity 
Data integrity is concerned with ensuring 
that information is not modified or altered during 
communication. Effective security measures must 
be implemented to prevent a malicious mode or an 
attacker from changing the data or information that 
can cause the network to go disarray. 
2.3. Data Freshness 
It is important that only the latest or most 
recent messages are delivered. In other words, the 
data must remain “fresh” at all times. This is 
particularly important when shared-key strategies 
are implemented in the network, because shared-
keys are altered, constantly for security. Malicious 
attackers can launch a replay attack because these 
keys take time to propagate throughout the network. 
The network can also be disrupted if the sensors do 
not know when to change the keys. This problem 
can be overcome by including a nonce or time-
related counter in the data packet to guarantee 
freshness. 
2.4. Availability of the Network 
Network availability is concerned about 
the stable operation and availability of the network 
as a whole. Additional costs are incurred to modify 
the traditional encryption algorithms for a WSN. 
Thus, some approaches avoid these costs by 
modifying and recycling the codes as much as 
possible, while others use different methods of 
communication in a WSN. Another approach 
enforces strict limitation on data access, and 
proposes some inappropriate schemes to simplify 
the algorithm. Most of these approaches, however, 
weaken the sensors and reduces network 
availability because of the following reasons: 
 Power supply is required for additional 
computing, thus, if it is not available, then, 
there can be no access to the data. 
 Power supply is also required for additional 
communication. If communication traffic 
increases, then the chances of conflicts also 
increase. 
If a centralised scheme is implemented, 
failure event at a single point might adversely affect 
the availability of the network.  
2.5. Authentication 
Data authentication is about ensuring that 
data received by a node for any decision-making 
process must come from the correct source. It is 
known that attackers will also insert additional 
packets into the packet stream besides modifying 
the data packets, to cause disruptions. During the 
construction of the sensor network, the 
authentication process is important for executing 
administrative tasks, for example, network 
programming, controlling the sensor node duty 
cycle, etc.  Authentication is also very important to 
many sensor network applications. Data verification 
assures the receivers that the data they receive is 
sent from the correct sender. A pure symmetric 
mechanism is used for data authentication in a two-
party communication. Using this method, the 
sender and receiver share the same secret key to 
generate the MAC (Message Authentication Code) 
for all the transmitted data packets. Perrig et al. 
(2002) proposed the use of a key-chain distribution 
system for their μTESLA secure broadcast protocol. 
It is aimed at achieving asymmetric cryptography 
by delaying the disclosure of the symmetric keys. 
The sender broadcasts a message using a secret key, 
which will be disclosed only after a certain time. 
Until the key is disclosed, the receiver will buffer 
all the packets. Once the secret key is disclosed, the 
packets will be authenticated provided that it had 
been received before the disclosure of the secret 
key. However, the disadvantage is that some 
preliminary information must be unicasted to every 
sensor before the authentication process can begin.  
Liu and Ning (Liu & Ning, 2003, 2004) 
proposed an enhancement to the μTESLA system. 
Their system involved broadcasting, rather than 
unicasting, the key chain commitments. Several 
methods were proposed, ranging from those 
involving simple and pre-determined key chains to 
those involving the multi-level key chain. In order 
for a scalable key to be achievable, pre-
determination and broadcasting are applied to the 
multi-level key chain scheme. This is primarily 
aimed at mitigating the denial of service attacks, 
and jamming. 
3. Layering-based attacks 
3.1. Physical Layer  
Jamming is one of the well-known 
methods of physically attacking a wireless network. 
It will cause interference to the node’s radio 
frequency in the network. The attacker sequentially 
transmits, and refuses the underlying MAC protocol 
of the wireless network. This can cause serious 
interruptions to the network traffic, especially, if 
only one frequency is used in the network. It can 
also cause the nodes to use excessive amount of 
energy due to the insertion of irrelevant packets into 
those nodes (Kim, Kim, & Choi, 2009).  
Xu, Trappe, Zhang and Wood (2005) 
identified four different types of jamming attacks 
that can seriously disrupt or stop the wireless 
network operations. They wanted to assess the 
effect of jamming on the nodes during the sending 
and the receiving processes. However, they lacked 
the appropriate measuring system (for carrier 
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sensing time and signal strength) to evaluate the 
effect of the jamming attacks. Also, even with clear 
difference between the two conditions, using packet 
deliveries would not show the cause of poor link 
(from node mobility or jamming) in the network 
(Xu, Trappe, Zhang, & Wood, 2005).  
Another type of physical attack is 
tampering, which causes physical damages to the 
nodes (Jeon, 2006). Table 1, below, lists the 
physical layer threats and the countermeasures 
against those threats (Kalita & Kar, 2009).  
Table 1: Physical Layer Threats 
Threat  Countermeasure  
Interference  Channel hopping and Blacklisting  
Jamming  Channel hopping and Blacklisting  
Sybil  Physical protection of the devices  
Tampering  Protection and changing of keys  
3.2. Data Link Layer  
Aside from the physical layer, the link 
layer is also open to malicious attacks. Attackers 
can premeditatedly ignore or violate the 
communication protocols and send messages 
frequently in an attempt to cause collisions. Packets 
affected by the collision will have to be re-
transmitted. In this attack, the adversary can force 
an excessive amount of retransmission on a node 
and cause its power supply source to be totally 
exhausted (Walters, et al., 2007). Table 2 below 
shows the data link layer threats and the 
countermeasures against them (Kalita & Kar, 
2009). 
Table 2: Data-Link Layer Threats 
Threat  Countermeasure  
Collision  CRC and Time diversity  
Exhaustion  Protection of network ID and other 
information that is required to joining 
device  
Spoofing  Use different path for re-sending the 
message  
Sybil  Regularly changing of keys  
De-
synchronization  
Using different neighbours for time 
synchronization  
Traffic analysis  Sending of dummy packet in quiet 
hours: and regular monitoring WSN 
network  
Eavesdropping  Key protects DLPDU from 
eavesdropper  
3.3. Network Layer  
The sensor node benefits from multi-
hopping by simply refusing to route messages at the 
network layer. This can happen frequently or 
irregularly, and will result in neighbouring node 
that marks the route, not being able to exchange 
messages with other nodes in the network (Walters, 
et al., 2007; Wood & Stankovic, 2002).  
Attacks in the form of forced entry or 
access without authorisation into the network layer, 
can be divided into two categories: passive, and 
active. In a passive attack, an attacker trespasses 
without interrupting the running of the network. 
The attacker is only looking for information, and 
eavesdropping on the network traffic without 
modifying any data. It is quite difficult to detect 
passive attacks because they do not change any 
functions of the node or the network. 
Active attacks are, however, totally the 
opposite of passive attacks. These attacks interfere 
with the network by modifying the messages that 
contain data packets and routing control packets. 
An attacker uses the routing packets to cause havoc 
on the network and force the creation of useless 
routing table to be created at the source. 
The attacker can also cause the 
communication to be broken by attacking data 
packets, even though it assists other nodes by 
creating a legal route between both the sender and 
the receiver. Some examples of active attacks are 
Wormhole attacks (Y-C Hu, Adrian Perrig, & David 
B Johnson, 2003), Blackhole attacks (Deng, Li, & 
Agrawal, 2002), Byzantine attacks (Awerbuch, 
Holmer, Nita-Rotaru, & Rubens, 2002), DDoS 
attacks (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La Porta, 
2005) and routing attacks (Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian 
Perrig, & David B Johnson, 2003; Peter, 
Langendorfer, & Piotrowski, 2008). Active attacks 
can also be categorised based on whether they 
target the data plane or the control plane, for 
example, key distribution or routing protocols.  
Encryption schemes and hash functions 
are commonly used to maintain data integrity and 
proper authentication. The centralised key 
management approach is also used in tandem with 
the encryption methods. The Certification of 
Authority is applied in the public keys as a way of 
effecting node communication security (Jeon, 
2006). Table 3, below, shows the network layer 
threats and the countermeasures against those 
threats (Kalita & Kar, 2009): 
Table 3: Network Layer Threats 
Threat  Countermeasure  
Eavesdropping  Session keys protect NPDU from 
eavesdropper.  
DoS  Protection of network-specific data link 
network ID etc. Physical protection and 
inspection of network.  
Selective 
forwarding  
Regular network monitoring using source 
routing.  
Sybil  Resetting of device and changing of 
session keys.  
Traffic Analysis  Sending of dummy packet in quiet hours: 
and regular monitoring of WSN network.  
Wormhole  Physical monitoring of field devices, and 
regular monitoring of the network using 
Source Routing. Monitoring system may 
use packet leach  
3.4. Transport Layer  
The transport layer is also vulnerable to 
attacks, particularly, flooding attacks. It can be as 
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simple as sending large number of connection 
requests to a vulnerable node. In this attack, sender 
is assigned to manage the request for a connection, 
which would lead to the depletion and exhaustion 
of the node’s resources. Eventually, the node will be 
rendered useless (Walters, et al., 2007). 
4. Intrusion Detection in Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
In a typical wireless sensor network, 
cryptography is often used as a method to secure 
the network against entries from external 
unauthorised nodes. However, cryptography is 
unable to prevent attacks from nodes that possess 
several of the keys. Brutch and Ko (2003) divided 
the intrusion detection system (IDS) into two 
categories: host-based system and network-based 
system. They further categorise them as signature-
based system, anomaly-based system, and 
specification-based system. The host-based IDS 
operates through the OS audit trails, the system 
calls audit trail, logs, etc, while, the network-based 
IDS operates on the packets that are captured in the 
network (Brutch & Ko, 2003).  
The role of signature-based IDS is to 
monitor the network for the presence of certain 
signatures that could indicate intrusion. The 
anomaly-based IDS define, a standard behaviour 
pattern and any behaviour that deviates from the 
standard pattern, is an indication of an intrusion into 
the system. The specification-based IDS follows a 
set of constraints that are specific to the correct 
operation of the program or network (Brutch & Ko, 
2003). 
 
 
 
Brutch and Ko have also described various 
types of attacks on the wireless sensor networks, and 
introduced three architectures to detect intrusions in 
the network. In first architecture, known as the 
stand-alone architecture, every node in the network 
functions as an independent intrusion detection 
system. These nodes are responsible for detecting 
any possible attacks, which are directed them. Each 
node acts on its own and does not cooperate while 
other nodes, in any way(Brutch & Ko, 2003).On the 
other hand, the second architecture follows the 
distributed and cooperative approach. Each node 
contains an intrusion detector and is responsible for 
detecting intrusion on itself (local attacks), but all 
the nodes cooperate with each other to share 
information and to provide support against global 
intrusion attempts. The third architecture which is 
the hierarchical architecture, is more suitable for 
protecting multi-layered wireless sensor network. 
Brutch and Ko described the multi-layered network 
as one network but divided into different clusters, 
and the routing responsibility falls on the cluster 
head. This multi-layered network can be mainly used 
for event correlation. Albers et al. Suggested that the 
intrusion detection architecture on each node should 
be based on the local intrusion detection system 
(LIDS). (Albers et al., 2002). 
In order for the nodes “vision” or design to 
be extended across the network, Albers suggested 
that the LIDS within the network should work with 
one another. There are two types of information 
being exchanged within the network: (1) security 
data – a method to simplify exchange of information 
with the hosts from other networks; and (2) intrusion 
alerts – a method to inform about locally detected 
intrusions to other LIDS (Albers, et al., 2002). 
Figure 1 shows a pictorial representation of the 
LIDS architecture.  
By running SNMP on the mobile host, the 
MIB (Management Information Variable) can be 
accessed, and the block labelled LIDS is where the 
component of the LIDS resides. The interface of the 
SNMP agent was designed in the local MIB to 
provide support for variable collection from both the 
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local LIDS and the mobile agents. The role of the 
mobile agents is to collect data and process them 
from remote hosts, specifically, the SNMP requests. 
They have the capability to migrate between hosts 
and to transfer information back to their original 
LIDS. On the other hand, the local LIDS agent is 
responsible for detecting and responding to any local 
intrusion, and to the events that originated from 
remote nodes (Albers, et al., 2002). Albers et al. 
suggested that the audit source for each LIDS should 
use SNMP auditing. They also suggested that the 
mobile agents should take the responsibility for 
transporting the SNMP messages instead of sending 
it over an unreliable UDP connection. Albers 
suggested the use of anomaly detection or misuse 
detection method to check against any intrusions. 
The LIDS should immediately communicate any 
known intrusion to other LIDS, in the network, 
which could respond by performing re-
authentication, or totally ignoring the affected node, 
if all the LIDS decide to take cooperative action 
(Albers, et al., 2002). 
This type of approach is not directly 
applicable in a wireless sensor network. However, 
this approach, which involves exploring localised 
information, could be the key to effective intrusion 
detection methods in a wireless sensor network 
(Estrin, Govindan, Heidemann, & Kumar, 1999). 
Effective intrusion detection in wireless sensor 
network is still an unresolved issue, and needs to 
find an effective solution.  
5. Cryptography and WSN 
Wireless sensors are considered as 
constrained devices due to obvious limitations in the 
number of gates, power, bandwidth, etc. Like any 
traditional networks, it requires protection against 
malicious attacks such as eavesdropping, data 
alteration, and packet injection. To address this 
problem, data cryptography has been used as a 
method of protecting the network. Presently, sensor 
networks use symmetric key cryptography, 
exclusively, but this approach can put the entire 
network at risk if one of the nodes has been 
compromised. The problem arises because the 
shared key that is supposed to be a secret is exposed. 
This can be overcome by using one shared key 
among two nodes in the network. This approach, 
however, does not allow new nodes to be added to 
the network. Thus, for a sensor network with n 
number of nodes, each node must possess (n - 1) 
number of keys. These keys must be established in 
the network, together with a mechanism to distribute 
the secure keys. Currently, the sensor devices have 
very limited computational power. This limitation 
makes it too expensive, in terms of overhead, to 
implement the public key cryptography in the node. 
For example, a parameter size of 160 bits is required 
to achieve 80 bits of security in ECC, which it gives 
the same level of security as the 1024-bit RSA. 
Some studies had been conducted to evaluate 
different parameters in regard to the feasibility of 
PKC in wireless sensor networks (Peter, et al., 
2008). Other studies had evaluated different 
parameters such as the processing time, and memory 
requirements. Researchers have also been untaken 
pertaining to the use  of different architectures to run 
PKC, effectively (Modares, 2009). 
6. Conclusion  
The WSN still face many security 
challenges. These include issues pertaining to 
routing, provision of QoS, efficient use of energy, 
sensor security, and multicasting. It is imperative 
that network system originators and network 
providers to be constantly ahead to face all the 
challenges and threats to embedded systems. They 
must constantly reassess their network security 
requirements and deal with new threats and attacks, 
effectively. 
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